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A Taste o f Armageddon: When Warring
Is Done by Drones and Robots
Brian Stiltner

War by Remote Control
The late 1960s television show Star Trek excelled in one of the purposes of
science fiction: helping us think about a contemporary controversial prac
tice by imagining its use in a future world. In the episode A Taste of Arma
geddon,” the starship Enterprise visits a solar system in which two planets,
Eminiar and Vendikar, are locked in a centuries-old war. Long ago, these two
planets decided to reduce the physical destructiveness of their war by con
ducting it solely with computers. Each side would launch virtual attacks and
the computers would calculate the death toll. The attacked side would then
have x4 hours to send that many of its own citizens—people specifically
identified by the computers—to disintegration booths. If either side refused
to abide by this practice, the terms of their treaty would be discarded and
physical bombings would resume. The leaders of the planet Eminiar, visited
by Captain Kirk and some of his crew, are so fearful of the older style of war
fare that they maintain the simulated war with its real, deadly consequences.
Before the crew of the Enterprise realize what is going on, their starship
is virtually attacked by Vendikar. The leaders of Eminiar tell Captain Kirk
that all of his crew have been killed in the simulation, so they must report
for disintegration within a day. Kirk finds the scenario perverse. Wlien his
attempts to reason with Eminiar s leaders get nowhere, he disrupts the war
by destroying their main computer. He believes that the Eminians have been
lulled into complacency because they no longer see all the horrific conse
quences of war. Nonetheless, their terror at resuming conventional warfare
is shared by the Vendikans, who contact them to open up negotiations for
peace. Leaving the solar system, Kirk believes that his gamble was worth
it. After all, he says, the Eminians, who seem motivated to keep an orderly
14
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society, recognize that “actual war is a very messy business. A very, very messy
business.”
This episode sheds bght on the swift rise in the use of drones for counter
terrorist warfare. Like the computers used by the two planets, unmanned
weapohized drones have been touted as tools that enable necessary fighting
to continue, but more bearably. These weapons have played an increasing
role in the United States’ pursuit of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters and lead
ers. Supporters of drone attacks enthuse that the United States is “taking
out” many al-Qaeda leaders and combatants, with no loss of American sol
diers’ lives and with very few civilian deaths. Yet critics caution that war by
remote control lulls the United States into a false sense of security and makes
it difficult for Americans to see the all-too-messy consequences of war for
civilians. War with drones looks effective and safe—for us. But is it?
Weaponized drones are just one of several unmanned systems already
being used in the theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather than focus on
the ethical and legal use of drones in asymmetrical warfare, which has been
the subject of several other important books and articles,' this chapter will
address the ethical issues attending unmanned weapons, both drones and
robots. Humans’ experience with technology is typically that once a genie
is out of the botde, there is no putting it back in. So there is every reason to
believe that unmanned and robotic systems will figure increasingly in the
warfare of the future. It is important to keep in mind that such systems need
not only be used for fighting. There are relatively uncontroversial, even vir
tuous, applications for military robots and drones. But since these technolo
gies have already been used for fighting, with great controversy, the key ques
tion here is whether the just war tradition (JW T) has the resources to keep
their use directed to ethical ends. In principle, the answer is “yes,” but as with
any other application of just war principles, we have to follow the discipline
of the theory to gain any benefits from it.

Science Fiction Has Become Military Reality
It will be helpful to sketch a picture of the unmanned technologies already
in use and what might be coming down the pike. The four main uses for
unmanned systems are reconnaissance and surveillance, disarming bombs,
I . SeeJohn Kaag and SarahKreps, Drone Warfare (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2 .0 J 4 ) ; Brad
leyJayStrawser, ed.. Killing by Remote Control (NewYork: Oxford University Press, aoiz): and
Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman, eds.. Targeted Killings: Law and
Morality in an Asymmetrical World (NewYork: Oxford UniversityPress, zoi a).
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attacking, and rescue. Both drones and robots have been used for all four
purposes.^
Drones, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are flying
machines operated by a remote human operator but featuring varying
amounts of self-control. Many of them can stay up in the air for 2,4 hours or
more over Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Yemen and be controlled by some
one operating a joystick at an operations center in the United States. The
Predator, a zy-foot-long plane, which was first used for reconnaissance and
surveillance in the Balkan wars of the 1990s, saw heavy use in the Afghan
istan war. General Tommy Franks said in the early years o f the war, “The
Predator is my most capable sensor in hunting down and killing Al-Qaeda
and Taliban leadership and is proving critical to our fight.” P. W. Singer
reports, “The ugly litde drone has quickly become perhaps the busiest US
asset in the air. From June 1005 to June 2,006, Predators carried out 2,073
missions, flew 33,833 hours, surveyed 18,490 targets, and participated in
Z42 separate raids. Even with this massive effort, there is demand for more.”^
There are drones of all sizes and for alt purposes, from the 40-foot-long
Global Hawk to the 38-inch, 4-pound Raven. The Global Hawk is used in
Iraq in much the same way as the Predator, while the Raven is used by sol
diers for surveillance.
In a sort of irony, soldiers launch the tiny plane using the same overthe-shoulder motion that the Roman legionnaires used in war two
thousand years ago, just tossing a robot instead of a javelin. The Raven
then buzzes off, able to fly for ninety minutes at about four hundred
feet. Raven carries three cameras in its nose, including an infrared one.
Soldiers love it because they can now peer over the next hill_ or city
block, as well as get their own spy planes to control, instead of having
to beg for support from higher-ups.'*
This vignette illustrates that drones are used not only for shooting. Nor are
they used only abroad. After Hurricane Katrina, drones searched for survi
vors.^ More controversially, the Department of Homeland Security uses at

2. There are several books that report on the technical, military, and political aspects o f
drones; few books also consider military robots. The best book-length examination to date o f
both systems, and a primary resource for this chapter, is P. W. Singer, Wiredfor War: The Robotics
Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Penguin, 2009).
3. Ibid., 35.
4. Ibid., 37.
5. Ibid., 41.
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least ten drones to patrol the United States-Mexico border and wants to
purchase m ore/
While drones have been used for reconnaissance and rescue, their most
controversial purpose is to kill. To get a handle on the deadliness of drone
attacks is difficult, in large part because the administrations of presidents
George W. Bush and Barack Obama have been very secretive about the
deaths caused by drones, about when and where drones have been used, and
about their legal rationales for using drones. A well-respected bipartisan
report provides a helpful summary of American use over the past decade:
Unmanned aerial vehicles have been used extensively in Afghanistan
and Iraq, for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) pur
poses, to carry out strikes and to provide close air support to ground
troops. They have also become a weapon of choice for counterterrorism
strikes in regions where US troops are not engaged in ground combat.
Between zoo4 and 2.014, US UAV strikes in Pakistan are estimated to
have killed approximately a,000 to 4,000 people, while US strikes in
Yemen are estimated to have killed several hundred people. A small
number of UAV strikes are believed to have occurred in Somalia, and
there are also unconfirmed reports of US UAV strikes in a handful of
other countries, including Mali and the Philippines.’’
The second major unmanned technology is robots, which are more com
mon than people might realize. “All told as of zoo8, some twenty-two dif
ferent robot systems were operating on the ground in Iraq.”* PakBot is a
lawnmower-sized robot, and Talon is a tank-sized machine. Both robots
were used to search the wreckage at Ground Zero and then employed in
Afghanistan and Iraq to detonate improvised explosive devices (lEDs).
Another robot, called SWORDS, “is basically Talon’s pissed-off big brother,
with its gripping arm replaced with a gun mount.”^ In other words, robotic
systems, although so far mosdy used for reconnaissance and disarming lEDs,
can be weaponized like drones. Both drones and robots are controlled by
humans in their main operations, yet they rely upon sophisticated computer
chips and the power of wired networks and big data to work autonomously

6. TrahernJones, “U.S. Set to Deploy More Drones along U.S. Borders, Despite Concerns
about Effectiveness andCost,”WalterCronkite School ofJournalismandMass Communication,
September a4, 2.01}, http://cronkite.asu.edu.
7. Gen.JohnP. Abizaid(ret.) andRosaBrooks, co-chsxK,RecommendationsandReportofthe
Task Force on US Drone Policy, Stimson Center, June zo14, http://www.stimson.org.
8. Singer, Wiredfor War, 31.
9. Ibid., 30.
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much of the time. There is no reason, in principle, why they cannot be pro
grammed to make decisions to kill on their own.
This point raises the issue of how drones and robots will be used as part of
a systematic strategy of computerized warfare in the future. Singer describes
two different strategies that are already being put into use. The first is the
“mothership” strategy, which is modeled on how the US Navy is already using
its unmanned systems. Since it is difficult for submarines to move into shal
low waters and since traditional sonar gives away one’s location, unmanned
submarines are being used to expand the reach of traditional subs and ships.
Naval officers see robotic minisubs as the figurative eyes, ears, and teeth that
extend the reach of the mothership, which could even be a permanent sailing
base at sea.^“ The other strategic concept is the “swarm.” Weapons scientists
have studied natural predators for inspiration. The most efficient predators
hunt In packs; swarms are made up of independent parts without a single
leader necessary to coordinate them. These concepts are being used to plan
coordinated attack by swarms of drones and robots. “Much like being sur
rounded by bees, the experience of fighting against swarms may also prove
incredibly frustrating and even psychologically debilitating---- W ith the
simple rules guiding them and the simpler, cheaper robots that they require,
there is no limit on the size of swarms. iRobot has already run programs with
swarms sized up to ten thousand, while one DARPA researcher describes
swarms that could reach the size o f ‘zillions and zillions of robots. **
Singer concludes, “Whatever doctrine prevails, it is clear that the Ameri
can military is getting ready for a batdefield where it sends out fewer humans
and more robots.”'^ As on the planets of Eminiar and Vendikar, the attacks
may involve no humans, but the deaths certainly will. W hat does the JW T
have to say about this brave new world?

A Brave New—or the Same Old — World?
To answer the question about the current relevance of an ethical tradition
born some 1,600 years ago (dating its Christian formulation to Augustine),
it would be helpfol to reflect on whether the current situation is really as
new as it seems. Advances in weapons technology in every age tend to throw
the ethics of war into confusion for a time. There is often a feeling that a

10. Ibid., tiy.
11. Ibid., 2.34. iRobot is the company that created the PakBot. DARPA is the Defense
AdvancedResearch Projects Agency, acompanythat creates robots forthe US military.
12.. Singer, W iredfo r War, 136.
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new weapon is too destructive, too efficient, too far reaching, or too secret
to be controlled by just war principles. For some ethical theorists, the new
ness entails that the weapon must be flady rejected. For others, the newness
entails that the just war criteria are no longer relevant.
An interesting example is the medieval attempt to prohibit crossbows.
The medieval crossbow was a considerable technical advance on earlier bows,
because its arrows could be propelled over three hundred yards and pierce
chainmail armor. “This weapon was frightening because its lethal force
could be projected over unprecedented distances, wholly disrupting the
contemporary chivalric conventions of armed conflict.”^^ In 1139, the Cath
olic Church’s Second Lateran Council forbade the use o f crossbows. But the
prohibition effort was so unsuccessful that Gratian, compiling canon law
just a decade after this council, made no reference to the ban. As I concluded
with my coauthor David Clough in Faith and Force, “Here is an example of
important social conventions supported by powerful vested interests being
overturned by the raw military effectiveness o f a new weapons technology.
N ot even Christian combatants could resist using crossbows, which meant
that everyone ended up adopting them.”*^ In light o f this and other failed
attempts to forbid the use of certain weapons, those o f a realist bent often
claim that such attempts are naive.
Yet just war thinkers believe that we must keep trying to control the
means of war, difficult though the task is. A measure o f control is better
than no control at all. W hat’s more, just war principles can shape public dis
cussions about weapons, sometimes creating enough o f a public consensus
that prohibitions work. For example, there is broad—and, in my opinion,
largely effective—international consensus that no nation should possess
biological and chemical weapons. There is also an international consensus
that no nation should use nuclear weapons; but because the international
discussion took place in earnest only after several nations possessed nuclear
weapons, it was politically feasible to draw the line only at the initial nuclear
club o f five coimtries.*^ The limitations on all three types of weapons are
enforced in treaties, using standards drawn from the JW T, as mediated

13. David L. Clough and Brian Stiltner, Faith and Force: A Christian Debate about Hkr
(Washington, DC: Georgetown UniversityPress, 1007), 111.
14. Ibid., 111.
15. This line did not hold, but only four other countries have become nuclear states since,
three of thembeingthe only countries not to ratifythe 1968 Treatyon the Non-Proliferation of
NuclearWeapons (NorthKorea’sstatus aswithdrawnfromthe treatyis complexandcontested).
The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been ratified by more countries than any other arms-control
treaty. See the UN Office on Disarmament Affairs, http://www.un.org.
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through international law. These limitations are among the successes of just
war theory: not ending all wars, unfortunately, but preventing some wars
and bringing judgment and constraint to other wars.'^
W hether the tradition can also underwrite a consensus on the use of
drones and robots remains to be seen. It will be helpful to take stock of how
unmanned military systems are like and unlike past weapons. Weaponized
drones and robots appear to be similar to many weapons of the past in sev
eral ways:
• They kill.
• They are used because they advance war aims. Nations, armies, and
combatants adopt them either to gain a competitive advantage or to
try to even up the playing field.
• Too much faith can be placed in them. Hyperbolic rhetoric surrounds
new weapons. Political and military leaders often excitedly claimed
that a new weapon is going to make a decisive difference or end a war.
Almost always, they overpromise.
• The user—whether a nation or a soldier—can give over too much
power to the weapon. This happens when the use of the weapon influ
ences strategy and policy rather than the reverse. In other words, the
weapon is used because it can be, without sufficient consideration given
to long-term consequences. This dynamic happens to some degree with
just about every breakthrough in weapons technology.
• Many new weapons encourage a myth of precision. The weapons get
more deadly and precise, but never precise enough to remove all moral
concerns. The crossbow was more precise and allowed the shooter to
fight from a safe distance, but no safer once the other side got cross
bows, too. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs), which broke into the
publics attention during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, still killed civil
ians. Drones and PGMs are limited by what a camera can see and by
what a human operator thinks the camera is showing.
• Unmanned systems, like any weapon developed for traditional warfare
against other countries, can be used domestically. This is true of guns.

16. See Clough and Stiltner, Faith and Force, zzz.
17. Certainly there are times that a new weapon made a decisive change in a war, but the
change is never as wonderful as the rhetoric states. The extreme example is the United States
dropping two atomic bombs onJapan to precipitate the end of World\C^r II. Their use caused
enduring moral controversy, while historians continue to debate whether World War II would
have ended soon enoughwithout the bombings. See the discussionin Clough andStiltner, Faith
and Force, i a2,-14and 131-35, and the resources listed in a61 n. 40.
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body armor, helicopters, and so on—and, as noted above, it is already
true of drones.^®
• These weapons can spread to other nations and even nonstate actors.
The black-market trade in small arms has been a huge problem for
the international community. N ot infrequendy, arms that the United
States gives to its allies end up in the hands of its enemies and are
directed back against US soldiers.’^ There is no reason the same thing
won’t happen with drones and robots. In fact, it happens already, as
when Iraqi militants repurposed an lED-detonation robot and outfit
ted it with an lED to send back at American soldiers.^®
• Weapons of any sort very often breed resentment among the civilian
populations on which they are used. In guerilla wars throughout his
tory, large nations have been drawn into fights in which they appear as
behemoths strewing indiscriminate destruction. Fairly or not, the large
nation with the superior technology is placed in the role of Goliath
against David, giving local civilians more reason to sympathize with
insurgents. Theologian Paul E M. Zahl says that the same happens
with drones: “This method of fighting reduces people on the ground
to a condition of absolute helplessness, because they cannot fight back
against unmanned drones__ It creates resentment in the people we
are fighting__ People cannot be expected to take this one-sided war
fare ‘lying down.’”^^ Placing too much faith in a weapon can blind lead
ers to such consequences.
Alongside these similarities, there are three ways that the unmanned
systems are markedly different from all previous weapons. The first is that
the operator can be extremely distant from the fighting. The only previous
weapons that have something of this feature are long-range missiles such as
cruise missiles launched from land, ship, airplane, or submarine, and inter
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) armed with nuclear warheads. But
these are blunt weapons that do major damage. The drone is new in being a

18. Inprotest of the lackoflaws andpolicies controllingthe use ofdrones within the United
States. Kentucky Senator Rand Paul famously conducted atraditional filibuster for 13hours on
March 6-7,1013. TheNew York Times editorializedon the types of domestic policies that Con
gress should enact in “PuttingDrones to the Test”(January 5, 2014). So far there has beenlitde
actionfromCongress.
19. For one recent example, see Rowan Scarborough, “Fast & Furious, Part II: No Way
to Keep US. Weapons out of Enemy Hands in Syria,” Washington Times, September 13, 1013,
http://www.washingtontLmes.com.
20. Smget, Wiredfor War,
21. Paul F. M. Zahl, “It’s anUnfair Fight,”Christianity Today, August i, 2011,64.
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rather precise weapon that enables an operator to take a great deal o f time
to think about whether, when, how, and whom he will shoot, and then to
do so—from thousands of miles away. Many American drone operators go
to an office of sorts, figuratively working “from 9 to 5” while they fight in a
war. Then they return to their families and personal life. While some are not
troubled by the incongruity, others have found the situation psychologically
stressful, even to the point of suffering post-traumatic stress disorder.^^
The second difference is that the drone is a weapon that fits perfecdy with
a new style of open-ended, nontraditional war. The “war on terror” is the
term that American leaders, especially during the administration of Presi
dent George W. Bush, have used to describe the pursuit and elimination
o f terrorist groups anywhere in the world. There are many novel features
of this military campaign, including that the groups do not fit the tradi
tional status o f combatants, which has served as a justification by the Bush
and Obama administrations to conduct military actions outside the rules
of international treaties and just war standards.^^ In the case of drones, the
questionable actions have included: (a) the military use of drones by agen
cies other than the military, namely, by the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA); (b) sending drones into the airspace of other countries with whom
we are not at war, particularly Pakistan and Yemen, in the pursuit of terror
ists; and (c) killing persons when they are not carrying weapons and not
currently engaging in any act of aggression.
The third difference has been alluded to in the above discussion of the
mothership and swarm doctrines; immanned systems are designed to think
for thenlselves, at least to a degree. This is one of the three components of
^ y th in g that counts as a robot. A robot has sensors that read the environ
ment; processors, or artificial intelligence, that decide how to respond; and
effectors “that act upon the environment in a manner that reflects the deci
sions, creating some sort of change in the world around a robot.”^"*While
current robotic weapons systems depend on a human operator to do any
thing deadly, there is no reason the machines will not become increasingly
smart and autonomous. The swarm doctrine is premised on the idea that

22. ElisabethBumiller, “Air Force Drone Operators Report High Levels ofStress,”New York
Times, December 19,2011, A8. This report is citedbyAbizaidandBrooks, Recommendations, 25.
23. Kaagand Kreps suggest that both the Bush and the Obama administrations have failed
to support the legality ofmost of their drone strikes. “Ihe more restrictive interpretations oijus
ad helium conclude that the onlyplace where drone attacks are plausiblylegal is inAfghanistan,
wherethe UnitedStates initiatedawarofself-defense afterthe 9/11 attacks. Consequendy, drone
attacks are not legal in countries with which the United States is not in adeclaredconflict, such
as Pakistan, Yemen, andSomalia”{Drone Warfare, 86).
24. Singer, Wiredfor War, 67.
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thousands of “dumb” drones or robots will work together in a sophisticated
network that will continually adapt to the fighting environment in real time.
The swarm will think for itself and decide how to respond.

Can Wir with Drones and Robots BeJustly Conducted?
Should one be more impressed with the similarities or the differences
between old and new weapons ? A reasonable approach is to take account of
both. The political, economic, cultural, and military conditions that prompt
the creation of new weapons are as old as humanity: people are motivated by
power and fear, and they are prone to engage in wishful thinking. Just war
principles can address drones and robots along the same hnes as crossbows,
chemical weapons, and nuclear weapons, because behind the use, of all of
them are very similar motivations. But each weapon type requires its own
particularized response, based on the nature of the weapon and the con
text of its use. So how do the long-standing just war criteria apply to drones
and robots? This section will briefly summarize the application o f the justconduct (jus in hello) and just-decision (jus ad helium) criteria and then raise
questions of accountability.
The two jus in hello criteria govern how weapons are used. The appar
ent innovation with drones and other PGMs are that they make it much
easier to respect the criterion oidiscrimination, which requires that weapons
and acts of fighting must distinguish between combatants and noncomba
tants, never intentionally targeting the latter. Drones respect this criterion
in their design. Their precision can potentially make a campaign waged with
them morally better than the same campaign waged with larger, “dumber”
bombs. But their technical precision does not automatically make them free
of moral problems. First, the technical precision of drones can mislead their
operators. Christian just war theorist Daniel M. Bell, Jr., notes, “The ‘soda
straw’ optics of drones may inhibit the ability to discriminate appropriately
because they exclude the surrounding context. For example, I was once told
of a drone being used to take out a bridge. The narrow field of view of its
optics did not include a passenger train that was approaching the bridge and
did not have time to stop.”^’ Second, the distance at which drones are used
might make it psychologically easier to fire them, increasing the chances of
abuse. Finally, it is not easy to decide who is a proper target in asymmetrical

15. Daniel M. Bell, Jr., “The Drone Wars andJust War,”/o«r«<*/o f Lutheran Ethics 14, no. 6
(June 1014), http://www.elca.org/JLE/Articles/71, paragraph6.
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counterterrorist warfare. The legal and ethical issues are very murky.^^ A
drone can set its sights on a house where cameras saw a man enter—an
American citizen who is active in al-Qaedat This situation is nothing like a
solider on a battlefield with a gun in his hand, so is this man a legitimate tar
get? Many ethicists and international lawyers say “no,” but American drone
policy has permitted such people to be killed.
The second in hello ciitcnon, proportionality, holds that the use o f a par
ticular weapon must reasonably promise to produce more overall good than
harm. The reason for this stipulation is that the ongoing use of weapons even
in a discriminating manner can add up to a morally problematic result. The
classic principle of double effect, which guides the application of discrimina
tion, allows some low level of collateral damage—of civilians who are acci
dentally or unintentionally killed in the prosecution of a justified war. The
principle even allows some such civilian deaths to be “foreseen” as long as
they were not the intended result. But what is a low level and how scrupu
lous does an army have to be? Double effect can operate as a fig leaf if it is
reduced to the claim that one did not intend to kill civilians. In addition,
the concept of proportionality can also be abused, because the standards
of what is too much violence in light of the hoped-for result is difficult to
establish. Because of these problems, the just war theorist Michael Walzer
has famously articulated the tradition s concept of “due care,” which is a posi
tive commitment to save civilian lives even when that means soldiers put
themselves at risk.^^
It is not clear whether the United States has been scrupulous enough. At
least early on in the drone wars, it very arguably was not. The New America
Foundation conducts an ongoing analysis of deaths in the US drone cam
paign in Pakistan. It estimates that in 48 strikes conducted by the Bush
administration, up to 557 people were killed, with the civilian death rate
falling between 2,0 and 37 percent of the total. While the Obama admin
istration has conducted many more strikes (32,8) that have caused many
more deaths (up to 2,9 3z)# the Foundation estimates the civilian death toll
in these strikes as 5 to 10 percent of the total.^* Perhaps even 5 to 10 percent
reflects a lack of due care, but the significant decline also suggests that the
United States can better control drones i f it wants to.

2,6. KaagandKrejSs, Drone Warfare, 81-86.
27. Michael 'Wahn, Just and Unjust Wars, jrd ed. (NewYork, BasicBooks, 1000), 152-5728. New America Foundation. “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis,” http://securitydata.
newaiherica.net. I calculated the casualty rate based on the data this site reported as of August
20, 2014.
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W ith such trends in view, a June ao 14 report of a bipartisan commit
tee with several former senior military and intelligence officials argued that
drones do not cause disproportionately high civilian causalities. This report,
issued by the Stimson Center, states, “The frequency and number of civil
ian casualties resulting from US drone strikes also appear to have dropped
sharply in recent years, as UAV technologies have improved and targeting
rules have been tightened.”^^ The data has been body contested by support
ers and critics of drones, but all acknowledge that it is difficult to get a pre
cise picture because of the secrecy with which American administrations
conduct drone attacks. The Stimson panel is by no means a champion of
drones, but it believes that the greatest ethical and legal concerns are found
under the other part of just war theory.
Americas use of drones in counterterrorist warfare raises a number of
questions under theyws ad helium criteria. Is the possibility of future terror
ism from a certain group ajust cause for sending military strikes against that
group ? Does the United States have the legitimate authority under inter
national law to conduct drone attacks in countries with whom it is not at
war ? Have other strategies been exhausted, making bombings a last resort"*. Is
the strategy of drone strikes proportionate, in that it is likely to do more good
than harm in the long run, bringing a reasonable hope of peace*. And have the
strikes been carried out with morally right intentions*. Bell raises important
challenges to current drone practice on the last two points. An assessment
of proportionality has to consider how the whole policy affects Americas
standing in the eyes of other countries. Bell comments.
The best insights of counter-insurgency theory argue for a shift from
an “enemy-centric” approach that focuses primarily on destroying an
elusive enemy to a “population-centric” approach that focuses on pro
tecting civilians and communities from harm. The’drone wars of recent
years are oddly out of step with this insight and to the extent that they
make a just conclusion of the war more difficult, they run afoul of the
just war tradition.^®
As for right intention. Bell states, “No matter how precise the weaponry
or how close the trigger to its effects, if the one pulling the trigger is not a
person formed in the virtues that characterize a just war people, then that
technology will only amplify vice.”^^ Similarly, the Stimson report “is espe
cially critical of the secrecy that continues to envelop drone operations and

19. AbizaidandBrooks, Recommendations, 25.
30. Bell. “Drone Wars,”paragraph 15.
31. Daniel M. Bell, Jr., “Let Character Prevail,”Christianity Today, August i, zoi i, 65.
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questions whether they might be creating terrorists even as they are killing
them.”^^
Considered from both directions— in hello and ad helium—just war
theory clearly mandates rigorous reflection, control, and accountability.
Such qualities have been lacking in American drone policy, yet they are
urgently needed as unmanned war threatens to expand. Several ethical rec
ommendations emerge from the just war theorists and nonprofit organiza
tions that have studied unmanned systems:
• The Stimson panel leads its list of eight recommendations with the
need for the United States to “conduct a rigorous strategic review and
cost-benefit analysis of the role of lethal UAVs in targeted counter
terrorism strikes.” It also urges increased transparency in US policy and
more robust oversight and accountability mechanisms.^^
• Weaponized drones and robots should be acknowledged as the tools
of war that they are and used solely by military agencies, not in clan
destine departments of the government. They ought to be used only in
military campaigns under the standards of military ethics and inter
national law. The W hite House indicated its interest in moving in this
direction in May zo 13, but has not yet done so.^"*
• Human beings should always retain responsibility for decisions to kill.
In its
Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots, Human
Rights Watch argues that “robots with complete autonomy would be
incapable of meeting international humanitarian law standards. The
rules of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity are espe
cially important tools for protecting civilians from the effects o f war,
and fully autonomous weapons would not be able to abide by those
rules.” This report calls for international laws and national policies to
prevent the development, production, and use of fully autonomous
weapons, and for roboticists to develop a professional code prohibiting
the same.^^
• The international community needs to develop mechanisms of
accountability. The temptation is especially keen for small nations
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wishing to exert their influence (hence the smaller nations joining and
trying to join the nuclear club) and for superpowers who have resources
and technology that no one else has. Currendy, the United States is in
this position with drones and robots. It won’t be for long, though. It
should learn a lesson from the late 1940s when it was the only nation
with atomic weapons. By holding itself to a different standard than
other nations and by actually using these weapons, even if for osten
sibly good purposes, the United States harmed its moral standing in
the eyes of the world. Its bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are still
mentioned by rogue leaders as evidence of America’s hypocrisy. The
Stimson report foresees a similar problem emerging with drones: other
nations will appeal to America’s use to justify their own.^® The United
States has a chance to lead on establishing standards for drones, robots,
and similar technologies, but the window is closing.

Back to the Future
Based on just war criteria, we must raise serious questions about the wisdom
of warring with drones and robots. While drone systems are not inherendy
indiscriminate or disproportionate, they have been too heavily relied on by
American leaders in an age where the public is understandably reluctant to
see American soldiers deployed in hot combat but eager to be assured that
terrorist leaders are being killed. Unmanned systems create moral hazards
when we conduct war from a far remove, and they will create more hazards
if we start turning over decisions about targeting and killing to machines.^^
How much control are we willing to cede? One science fiction dystopia
is that the robots take over, as in the Terminator movies. We would seem
to be far away from that future, but not so far that we should not be plan
ning for it. The principle should be that a human being always decides on a
deadly action. Sure, persons are flawed in many ways, but they are morally
and legally accountable, and they understand the human stakes of war, even
when they try to ignore them.
Another science fiction dystopia is the one that began this chapter: that
technological war becomes so seemingly pristine that we slide into end
less war. The Star Trek episode sheds light not just on computerized war
in general but on the US “war on terror” in particular. America’s pursuit of
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terrorists through drones is like the simulated war in the episode, but in only
one direction: computer-aided attacks are ordered up, with one side experi
encing the deaths and the other side hardly ever seeing the results.
While Christianity has only been mentioned briefly in this chapter,
here is certainly a place where the churches and faithful citizens can bring
a distinctive perspective to the just-war discussion. As Bell rhetorically asks,
“W hat kinds of moral communities are necessary to resist the politics of
expediency that renders drones so tempting to our political leaders ? Perhaps
churches that embrace just war need to speak up and remind those leaders
that, as Walzer said, we are willing to bear the risk, the cost, the sacrifice nec
essary to avoid killing civilians and shattering communities . . . in short we
are willing to bear the costs ofwaging war justly.”^®Drones and robot armies
will test us, the people, as to whether we are up the challenge. Are we willing
to say “no” to something that is being done just because it can be done? The
JW T gives us the resources; we must be willing to use them. The first step is
moral perception: having the courage to look into what acts are being done
in our name and remembering that actual war is a very, very messy business.
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